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In two recent immigration cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the crucial role served by the judicial review of administrative power
in democratic society.' Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St.
Cyr involved the habeas corpus petition of a resident alien whom the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ('INS") intended to deport.
The habeas petition sought review of the Attorney General's opinion
that Congress had withdrawn the administrative discretion to waive
deportation of resident aliens who had plead guilty to an aggravated
felony.2 The Supreme Court held that the INS had not overcome 'the
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author
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1. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001); Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491
(2001).
2. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2276-77. Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 was interpreted to authorize a large class of resident aliens with at least
seven consecutive years of U.S. domicile to apply for discretionary waiver of deportation.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 amended the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act to identify a large set of offenses for which conviction would preclude the discre-
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strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action
and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional
intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction." In Zadvydas v. Davis,' the Su-
preme Court ruled in favor of two resident aliens, who having been
convicted of felonies and fulfilled prison terms, were then ordered de-
ported and subsequently detained indefinitely.' The Court refused to
defer to the Executive Branch and found that Congress had not
granted the Attorney General the discretion to detain the petitioners
beyond a reasonable time period of six months.6 Pursuant to the fed-
eral habeas statute, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was
available given the serious constitutional issue raised by indefinite
civil detention.7 Although both St. Cyr and Zadvydas concerned fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction as a distinct form of judicial review, the tech-
nically more narrow role played by habeas jurisdiction points to the
broader significance of the judicial review of administrative action in
protecting fundamental constitutional freedoms. 8
During the twentieth century, administrative governance
emerged as a characteristic of the modern democracy.' With the ad-
tionary authority of the Attorney General to waive deportation. Prior to enactment of the
1996 statutes, St. Cyr entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which he would have
been eligible for a waiver of deportation. Id. at 2273. His removal proceeding was com-
menced after the enactment of the 1996 statutes, and the Attorney General interpreted
the 1996 statutes to withdraw authority to waive deportation. Id. at 2276-77. The Su-
preme Court held that the 1996 statutes did not (1) deprive the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to review the St. Cyr's habeas petition and (2) apply retroactively to the plea agree-
ment. Id.
3. Id. at 2278.
4. 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).
5. Id. at 2495-97 (describing the specific factual backgrounds of the two peti-
tioners who were both detained beyond the ninety-day statutory period because no na-
tions were willing to accept the deportees).
6. Id. at 2498-2504.
7. Id. at 2497-98. The petitioners were not seeking review of the Attorney Gen-
eral's exercise of discretion. Rather, they challenged the extent of the Attorney General's
authority to detain them indefinitely following civil deportation proceedings in violation of
the constitutional due process guarantee. Id.
8. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2283-87 (discussing the distinction between habeas jurisdiction
and the more general jurisdiction of the federal courts to review administrative action).
9. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant
legal trend of the last century .... They have become a veritable fourth branch of the
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories ... !). See also James
Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 THE PUB. INT. 77 (1975); Mark Seiden-
feld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1515 (1992) (highlighting that the administrative government offers the "best hope of im-
plementing civic republicanism's call for deliberative decision making informed by the
values of the entire polity"); William IK Shirey, Accountability and Influence After Chev-
ron: Is the Regulatory State Consistent with Our Constitutional Heritage?, 86 GEO. L.J.
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vent of this century, the once absolute sovereignty of the nation state
has been challenged by the idea of "global regulatory governance."'"
Concomitant with these trends, the traditional understanding of ad-
ministrative law as involving judicial review to resolve disputes be-
tween private persons and public officials has been called into ques-
tion." The administrative state is now characterized by agency rule
making with an emphasis on the implementation of public policy
rather than the resolution of individual disputes.12 Enthusiasm for na-
tional and global regulatory regimes might be tempered by recalling
the words of Kenneth Culp Davis that rules per se "cannot cope with
the complexities of modern government and of modern justice." 3 The
diverse array of government endeavors to safeguard the environment,
assist the disabled, ensure medical care for the needy, afford adequate
housing for all citizens, manage social security, educate the young, or-
ganize immigration, facilitate electronic communications, protect in-
dividual privacy, grant licenses, and regulate diverse fields of indus-
2735, 2736, 2772 (1998) (emphasizing that the rise of the regulatory state needs to be rec-
onciled with the framework of U.S. Constitution); David B. Spence & Frank B. Cross, A
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 141-42 (2000) (making a
public choice argument in favor of the administrative state).
10. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globilization, Law, and the Transformation of
Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 425 (1999); Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8
(1993); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in the United States-Past, Present and
Future, 16 QUEENS L.J. 179, 201-03 (1991). Cf Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile
Case for Judicial Review of Rule making, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View From Liberal Democratic Theory,
88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 495 (2000) ("[A]t least for the foreseeable future, a global regime of
semiautonomous liberal nation-states represents the best means for fostering liberal
rights and institutions.").
1I. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF BUREAUCRACY 213-60 (1990). In his radical critique of American administrative justice,
Edley calls for a fundamental rethinking of the way in which the three branches of gov-
ernment interact with administrative agencies. Arguing that the "trichotomy of decision
making" no longer serves the purposes of sound governance, he proffers that these
branches, and in particular the judiciary, should enter into a direct partnership with ad-
ministrative authority. Id. See also Cross, supra note 10, at 1244 (calling for the abolition
ofjudicial review of agency rule making).
12. See E. Donald Elliot, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment
on Shapiro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523 (1983). But see Jonathyn T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective
in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judici-
ary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-18, 53-66 (2000) (emphasizing the independ-
ent role of the judiciary in the administrative state).
13. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 25 (1969).
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try, inter alia, require broad delegations of government power to ad-
ministrative agencies with specialized expertise."
Traditionally, judicial review has afforded an important check on
the exercise of administrative power. First, judicial review functions
to protect the legislative intent behind the statutory authorization of
the exercise of administrative power. Pursuant to the conventional
model, an administrative agency exercises restricted legislative and
judicial functions under judicial scrutiny to insure compliance with
congressional intent. 5 Judicial review insures that "a congressional
delegation of power ... must be accompanied by discernible stan-
dards, so that the delegatee's action can be measured for its fidelity to
the legislative will."'61 Additionally, the opportunity for judicial review
of administrative action corrects and prevents abuses of government
power exercised by non-elected bureaucrats and administrators such
as corruption and bribery, 7 incompetence,' inaction, 9 bias and preju-
14. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 3 (1965)
(identifying the subject of administrative law as "the relation between the courts and all
officers, 'executive' or 'administrative,' administering powers delegated to them by the
legislature'); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.1 (2d ed. 1978) (describing
administrative law as "the law that governs those who administer any part of governmen-
tal activities'); and JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. MEZINES, 1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.01 (1993) (defining administrative law as "the powers, functions
and procedures of the various administrative agencies and the methods provided for judi-
cial review of their decisions").
15. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944). In Yakus, the Court
sated:
[t]he Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does
not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that
Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative
action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has de-
clared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to par.
ticular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to in-
vestigate.
Id.
16. Eastlake v. Forest City Enter. Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976). See Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a delegation of legislative power
because an adequate standard was not expressed by the legislature in the statute).
17. See, e.g., Electricities of N. Cal., Inc. v. Southeastern Power Admin., 774
F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that even when a lawful exercise of an agency's discre-
tion enjoys immunity, an agency decision that is prompted by a bribe or undue influence
is not immune from judicial review).
18. See, e.g., Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding an abuse of
discretion when an administrator discontinued benefits to a veteran, who was totally dis-
abled by insanity and who failed to answer a questionnaire concerning his income).
19. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (holding that
voters had standing to challenge judicial review of the agency's decision not to bring an
enforcement action, as the statute implicitly authorizes such action). Cf Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding that an exercise of agency discretion not to under-
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dice. 21 Moreover, judicial review has functioned to insure that the
common law requirements of clarity,21 consistency,22 and fundamental
fairness 23 are observed by regulatory agencies.
2'
While the above-mentioned reasons remain valid justifications
for judicial review, this article focuses on the historical development of
judicial review in protecting two distinct, but interrelated, philosophi-
cal values embedded within the foundations of modern constitutional
government.25 The first involves the suspicion of government power as
take certain enforcement actions is not subject to judicial review under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act).
20. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (affirming the holding of
the federal district court that enjoined proceedings of the Alabama Board of Optometry on
the ground that the Board was biased and could not provide a fair and impartial hearing);
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (holding that the constitutional claims of a CIA em-
ployee, who was discharged for being a homosexual, were reviewable).
21. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)
(striking down an ordinance that vested the administrator with "uncontrolled discretion"
to vary the fee for assembling and parading).
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 90 (1943) (Chenery I) (remand-
ing an SEC order that disapproved a corporate reorganization plan on the ground that the
SEC decision was predicated on a judge-made principle of equity and not on its "special
administrative competence'; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947)
(Chenery II) (upholding the SEC's revised order that expressed with "clarity and thor-
oughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its order).
23. See, e.g., Brennan v. Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974)
(holding that when an administrative agency departs from a previously announced policy,
the agency must explain the departure from the previous policy or rule that seemed dis-
positive of the case at hand).
24. See generally, STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWARD, CASS R. SUNSTEIN
& MATTHEW L. SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES 415-550 (4th ed. 1998).
25. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
1101 (1988); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986); STEPHENN SKOWRONECK, BUILDING A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 (1982); DAVIS, supra
note 14, at 14-37; Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). Of these historical studies, Rabin's is the most thorough.
Three major historical periods in the development may be identified as: (1) from the in-
ception of the Republic until the Great Depression; (2) from the New Deal through post-
World War II; and (3) from the Great Society of the 1960s until the present. See DAVIS,
supra note 14, at 14-37. The three historical periods do not signify rigid or precise devel-
opmental stages. For an alternative historical framework, Aman posits three distinct eras
of American administrative law as follows: (1) the New Deal and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 1929-1959; (2) the environmental era, 1960-1980; and (3) the global era of
administrative law, starting in 1980. See Aman, supra, at 1101-1247. This article is in-
tended neither as a comprehensive historical account nor complete overview of the vari-
ous theories of administrative law. Rather, the method of the article is primarily descrip-
tive in an attempt to retrieve the significance of the conventional account of judicial re-
view to a democratic system of government given the unavoidable pervasiveness of the
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institutionalized in the constitutional doctrine of the tripartite separa-
tion of powers. 2 The second constitutional value safeguarded by judi-
cial review concerns the protection of personal autonomy through in-
dividual rights.2 ' Based upon the historical development of American
administrative law, the article recalls that judicial review, which
checks the power of un-elected bureaucrats, remains critical for main-
taining the suspicion of government power and protecting individual
autonomy in the regulatory state.28 This is not to suggest that auton-
omy and suspicion are the only or paramount values of the liberal po-
litical theory that underpins modern constitutional government. Lib-
eral theory, for example, also places a high premium on equality and
neutrality to facilitate participation in the political process. 29 Indeed,
the paradox of liberal theory is that while it defines freedom in terms
of personal autonomy, it depends at the same time on individual
commitment to participate in the common endeavor; and, while it fos-
ters suspicion about government power, it places confidence in the
rule of law."0 As shall be discussed, this tension may help to explain
the oscillation between deference and suspicion that has characterized
the history of the judicial review of administrative actions.
regulatory regime.
26. See Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Pow-
ers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (arguing that "the rigid
separation-of-powers compartmentalization of governmental functions should be aban-
doned in favor of analysis in terms of separation of functions and checks and balances').
27. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1202 (1982) (indicating that consistent with traditional
liberal theory, the courts' function to curtail government intrusions into the realm of indi-
vidual autonomy through a set of fundamental constitutional rights).
28. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in the Liberal State: The Role of Non-
Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1537-90 (1983). Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 274-284 (1971) (arguing that some government regulation is necessary to main-
tain a just distribution of resources in society so that all individuals are permitted to
compete as equals in the economic sphere); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974) (stating that certain inequalities such as intelligence and ability are innate
and that the good society requires a minimum of government regulation). For a radical
critique of the political and economic implications of the modern liberal state, see
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 145-90 (1975).
29. See PHILIP PETrIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT 18-31 (1997) (discussing "republican liberty" which means "freedom from
domination'; STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT. ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 28-30 (1995) (comparing liberal theory's "negative liberty" of freedom from
government interference and "positive liberty" of the individual's right of political partici-
pation and suggesting the borders between negative and positive conceptions of liberty
are often unclear).
30. Cf UNGER, supru note 28, at 63 (stating that the contradiction stems from
liberal theory's inability to arrive at "a coherent understanding of the relations between
rules and values in social life'.
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The Article traces the development of the two constitutional val-
ues of autonomy and suspicion through three historical periods: (1)
the origins of judicial review as the guardian of autonomy and suspi-
cion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; (2) judicial re-
view from the New Deal through the Administrative Procedure Act
and the movement from suspicion to deference as well as the refash-
ioning of the notion of autonomy; and (3) the administrative state
from the 1960s in terms of the limits of autonomy and the oscillation
between suspicion and deference. The Article thus suggests that the
historical development of administrative law in the United States has
bequeathed a heritage that serves to inform the increasingly perva-
sive reality of the national and global regulatory regimes.
I. THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS THE GUARDIAN OF
AUTONOMY AND SUSPICION
The remote origins of the development of American administra-
tive justice may be traced to classical liberal political theory.3 1 Two
important characteristics of the theory are an appeal to personal
autonomy as protected by individual rights and suspicion of govern-
ment power as maintained through the separation of powers.32 In the
classical liberal model, the value of the state resides in large part in
preserving the freedom of the autonomous individual to pursue licit
private ends and to afford a neutral forum for the resolution of dis-
putes.3 The state assists individuals to join with others who share or
advance various and disparate private goods.34 The philosophical un-
derpinnings of the principle may be found in Locke's political theory
pursuant to which the individual enters into a social contract in which
31. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1202-03; Stewart, supra note 28,
at 1539-46; Molot, supra note 12, at 12-20.
32. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 513-20; see also William A- Galston, Expressive
Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 869, 876-905 (1999). For a discussion of the separation of powers, see David
Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers:
A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 949 (1999) (agreeing that uncon-
strained delegations by Congress to administrative agencies threatens individual liber-
ties, but arguing that in reality Congress rarely participates in unconstrained delegation);
Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1454,
1500 (2000) (arguing that pursuant to the separation of powers, the judiciary plays a cru-
cial role in protecting minority rights).
33. See PETrT, supra note 29, at 18-31; HOLMES, supra note 29, at28-30.
34. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND
END OF CML GOVERNMENT, 330, 284 (Peter Laslett ed. 1988). See also Strauss, supra
note 23, at 1500 ("In nascent liberal theory, the primary function of government thus was
... the peaceful and authoritative resolution of existing disputes.').
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he cedes freedom to the state.3 5 It follows from this contractarian the-
ory of government that it is only the consent of the individual that
permits coercive control to be exercised by the government.
The people's consent is institutionalized in the allocation of the
power of government to the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, which function in a system of checks and balances to insure
that no one branch usurps more than its right proportion of govern-
ment power .3 The U.S. Constitution recognizes no inherent adminis-
trative powers over persons and property. The political realm of the
35. See LOCKE, supra note 34, at 364-65 ('CThere is another Power in every
Commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the
Power every Man naturally had before he entered into Society.'). In 1776, the year that
the original colonies declared independence from England, Adam Smith published the
WEALTH OF NATIONS, which supplied an economic basis for the political theory. The idea
of free markets unfettered by government regulation corresponded with Locke's idea that
the basis of governmental power was the consent of the people. See also THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 82-84 (Michael Oakeshott, ed. 1957). Espousing a more optimistic view of
human nature, later philosophers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Ralph Waldo Em-
erson, sought to liberate the native and spontaneous goodness of the human person
which, they thought, was inhibited and warped by society. Whatever their stance toward
the state of nature, all of the theorists championed the triumph of individualism. See gen-
erally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 4-18 (G. D. H.
Cole trans. 1950); RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS 389-401 (1951).
36. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 95-96, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART
MILL (Maurice Cowling, ed. 1968) (stating "[the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others'). This principle exerted an enormous influence on the development
of the modern Anglo-American legal tradition.
37. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1755-1807 (1996). The U.S. Constitution also reflected the view that written law, con-
sented to by individual persons, was preferable to the traditional conception of the com-
mon law. In 1787, the framers of the supreme statute designed a federal government
with distinct executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They intended to fashion a
document which would centralize power in a national government. Their experience
during and after the War for Independence from England had demonstrated the ineffec-
tiveness of a weak central government. At the same time, the framers were fearful of en-
trusting extensive power in a central authority, lest they replicate the tyrannical struc-
ture of government, which they had just overthrown. Many features of the Constitution
may be understood as an attempt to reconcile these two potentially conflicting ends in
one document. Rejecting the principle that identified law with the will of the sovereign,
the drafters espoused the position that legitimacy of the written Constitution rested upon
the consent of the people. The separation of government power into distinct executive,
legislative, and judicial functions was intended to insure that no one person or part of the
national government exercised unchecked power. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 43 (3rd ed. 1991).
38. See Richard B. Stewart, supra note 25, at 1667-72. For a discussion of recent
Supreme Court administrative law decisions in terms of the separation of powers, see
Oren Eisner, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential Interpretations of Ambiguities
in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes Delegating Law Making Power to the
President, 86 CORNELLL. REV. 411, 422-26 (2001).
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liberal state is one in which competing conceptions of what is "good"
clash. 3 This political process then results in compromises, accommo-
dations, and settlements, which are embodied in policy set forth
through the legislative power.'0 Distinct from the political realm, the
rule of law is the process in which the policies generated by the politi-
cal process are interpreted and applied to insure maximum equality
among citizens.' 1 The rule of law is, of course, institutionally embodied
by a neutral judiciary."2 An important function of the judiciary is to
protect individual rights against government constraint.
4 3
In the fountainhead of American constitutional law, Marbury v.
Madison," the Supreme Court held that Congress acted unconstitu-
tionally when it conferred upon the judicial branch the authority to is-
sue original writs of mandamus.45 The Supreme Court struck-down
the congressional statute conferring the authority on the ground that
the original jurisdiction of the Court as conferred in Article III of the
Constitution did not include the power to issue such writs.46 It was the
39. See RAWLS, supra note 28, at 399-407.
40. See id. at 235.
41. See Stewart, supra note 28, at 1540.
42. Cf KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECrmTY 12-13 (1992) (describing the
"rule of law" as "[t]he main criteria for judging the existence of a determinate answer is
whether virtually any lawyer or other intelligent person familiar with the legal system
would conclude, after careful study, that the law provides the answer").
43. See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 163-
66 (1957); RAWLS, supra note 28, at 239-40; see also Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies,
Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 707 (1999) (describing
constitutional democracy based upon liberal theory as "a political system with govern-
ments elected by popular majority, and with the rule of law enshrined to protect those not
in the majority).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. Id. A writ of mandamus issues from a court of superior jurisdiction and
commands an inferior tribunal, executive, or administrative officer, or an officer of some
private or municipal corporation to perform a purely ministerial duty imposed by law.
46. The well-known facts of Marbury involved a private individual who sought to
remedy an alleged injury as a result of the exercise of executive power. Id. at 137-8. The
private citizen, William Marbury, brought suit against the newly appointed Secretary of
State, James Madison, in order to compel Madison to deliver Marbury's commission as
justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138. President John
Adams signed Marburys commission on the eve of the inauguration of his successor
Thomas Jefferson. Id. President Jefferson appointed Madison as Secretary of State, and
Madison refused to deliver the commission of the so-called "Adams' Midnight-Judges." In
a peculiar twist of events, Chief Justice John Marshall, who authored the seminal Mar-
bury opinion, had served as Madison's predecessor as Secretary of State. The issuance of
Marbury's commission clearly depended on the exercise of executive power by Secretary
of State Madison. From the perspective of administrative justice, if Marbury were legiti-
mately appointed, it would seem an abuse for Madison to refuse to perform the ministe-
rial duty of delivering the commission. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, however, left
Marbury's grievance unvindicated. Instead, the Court used the case as the opportunity to
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first time that the Supreme Court invalidated legislation on the
ground that it failed to comply with a provision of the Constitution,
and thus, the principle of judicial review was established.47
Concomitant with the tripartite separation was the principle that
these separate powers ought not to be delegated. 8 As Justice Story
stated it: "[Tihe general rule of law is, that a delegated authority can-
not be delegated.4 9 The nondelegation doctrine was designed to insti-
tutionalize the legislature, which would be composed of elected offi-
cials, as primarily responsible for the exercise of government power."
Early in the history of the American republic, the impracticability of
the traditional prohibition against the delegation of judicial and leg-
islative powers to administrative agencies became readily apparent."
solidify its power of judicial review. 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 87-88 (1972).
47. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 42 (1962) (discuss-
ing that the holding in Marbury placed the Court "in the delightful position... of reject-
ing and assuming power in a single breath"). For an analysis of the power of federal
courts to engage in judicial review, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1959).
48. As previously indicated, the nondelegation doctrine can be traced to the lib-
eral political theory of John Locke, who wrote:
The power of the Legislative, being derived from the People by a positive
voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other than what the positive
Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legisla-
tors, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their Authority of
making Laws, and place it in other hands.
LOCKE, supra note 34, at 363.
49. Shankland v. Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 393 (1831) (The maxim was
"delegata potestas non potest delegari."). In the 1892 case of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892), the Supreme Court plainly stated the rule against delegation: "That Congress
cannot delegate legislative power... is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." Id
at 692.
50. See generally Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 32, at 949; Flaherty, supra
note 37, at 1755-1807; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250-56 (2nd
ed. 1988); Carl Friedrich, Separation of Powers, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
663-66 (1934).
51. In The Big Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), the Supreme Court upheld
a delegation by Congress to the President to lift an embargo imposed by statute on cer-
tain European trade, when the President found that the foreign nations affected by the
legislation had "ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States." Id. Like-
wise, in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), the Court approved a con-
gressional delegation of power to the federal courts to fashion their own rules of proce-
dure. See generally, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7-9 (1941). Cf DAvID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY 9-10 (1993) (arguing that delegation is used by Congress and the Presi-
dent to shield themselves from blame for poor public policy and that it does not serve a
useful purpose); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1525-27 (arguing that broad delegation to
administrative agencies is justified by civic republicanism since the agencies "fall between
the extreme of the politically overresponsive Congress and the overinsulated courts").
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In 1789, the first session of the First Congress enacted two statutes to
create the Customs Service under the jurisdiction of the Treasury De-
partment.52 Pursuant to these early federal laws, port collectors were
vested with broad discretion to determine the amount of duties pay-
able on imported and exported goods.53 By 1810, the fourth Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court characterized such a collector of duties as a
"quasi-judge." In 1813, the Supreme Court found it permissible for
Congress to delegate legislative power by permitting administrative
agencies to make rules to govern particular areas.5 5 The separation of
powers required that this delegation be subject to judicial review.56
Subsequent sessions of Congress witnessed further delegations of
government power so that by the time of the Civil War federal agen-
cies exercised a variety of rule making and adjudicatory powers. 7 The
United States emerged from the Civil War poised to become a world-
class industrial power." The rise of big business in the post-Civil War
52. Many members of the First Congress were also members of the various
State Conventions that ratified the Constitution, which suggests that to some extent the
legislators accepted a certain delegation power as consistent with the original architec-
ture of the Constitution. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29 (1789); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, 1
Stat. 55 (1789).
53. This broad discretion is more enhanced than the "ministerial" discretion
normally associated with executive power. The traditional remedy against an abuse of
ministerial discretion remains the writ of mandamus. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (refusing to issue a writ of mandamus because underlying statute was
unconstitutional); Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (finding that the Commissioner
of Pensions' action amounted to more than a mere ministerial duty and thus mandamus
was not available); Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union 419 v. Brown,
656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that mandamus relief appropriate if federal ad-
ministrative officials failed to comply with Davis-Bacon Act, Service Contract Act of 1965,
and administrative regulations promulgated thereunder). Because it is limited to address
abuses of ministerial discretion, mandamus has proved to be an ineffective tool to correct
injuries suffered by individuals as a result of the broad discretion now delegated to ad-
ministrators. See 4 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 156-82.
54. Scott v. Negro Ben, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3, 7 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.).
55. See The Big Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 1382 (1813); see also Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (ruling that Congress may delegate to courts the
authority to alter modes of proceedings but state legislatures do not possess this power).
56. Several commentators have observed that while the Supreme Court has
never formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, it has been seriously, arguably fa-
tally, compromised. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 14, at 150-157. See also Peter H. Aranson,
Ernest Gellhorn and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1982).
57. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
ADMINISTRATIvE.PROCEDURE 8-9; see also CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 1994) ("The pace of growth [of administrative agencies] accelerated
after 1860 as new departments were added.").
58. See 2 MORISON, supra note 46, at 74-75. At the end of the Civil War, there
were approximately two million factory workers producing $3,385,000,000 worth of goods.
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period prompted increased government regulation. 59 In Munn v. Illi-
nois,'o the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Illinois law, which set
maximum rates for storage in grain elevators.6 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the rates violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition against the taking of private property without due
process of law. 2 It articulated the principle that "when private prop-
erty is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be a juris privati
only." 3 The principle that justified regulation was in accord with lib-
eral economic and rights theory.1 State regulation of the rates was
sometimes necessary to insure that individual entrepreneurs might
flourish in a competitive and neutral market.' In Munn, the Supreme
Court exercised judicial review and upheld the state regulation on the
ground that the regulation was necessary to maintain a competitive
market."
The legitimacy of judicial review of administrative action was
further developed by the regulation of the railroads during the nine-
teenth century. 7 In 1887, Congress attempted to regulate the rail-
Id. at 72. Id. at 72. Thirty years later in 1899, there were approximately six million fac-
tory workers producing $11,407,000,000 worth of goods. Id.
59. Organized labor was a response to the massive pool of potential workers cre-
ated by the waves of immigration that characterized the post-Civil War period unfair
working conditions, exploitation, and inadequate compensation led to widespread labor
unrest stimulating the need for government regulation. Annual immigration passed
300,000 persons in 1866 and rose to almost 790,000 in 1882. Id. at 80-83.
60. 94 US. 113 (1876).
61. Id. at 114-17.
62. Id. at 135-36. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1208.
63. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126 (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, 1
HARG. LAW TRACTS 78).
64. The principle reflected another one drawn from an earlier New York case,
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cal. R. 307 (N.Y. Ch. 1805). The New York court had abrogated the
common law rule regarding water rights, under which downstream landowners were
permitted to recover damages for obstructions created by upstream owners when the ob-
struction blocked the natural flow of water. Id. In Palmer, a downstream plaintiffs claim
for damages as a result of an upstream private dam was disallowed on the ground that
the construction of the dam advanced business interest by enabling competition. Id. For a
statement of the common law rule, see Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).
65. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1208-09.
66. 94 U.S. at 131-2. See MORTON J. HORWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 2-3 (1977).
67. Railroads exercised immense power and through the mere manipulation of
rates could make an industry or ruin a community. Yet, it would be an oversimplification
to view railroads as the victors in a conquest between themselves and the producers.
Railroads also suffered from competitive pricing in certain areas of the country. See
Rabin, supra note 25, at 1197-1201. With colossal funds at their disposal, the financial re-
sources of railroads often overshadowed the budgets of the state governments in whose
territory they operated. See GEORGE HILL MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS
19-20 (1971). Enchantment with progress and development and opposition to increasing
the powers of the federal government led most Americans of the period to view the rail-
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roads when it passed the first Interstate Commerce Act, which de-
clared illegal all "unreasonable" rates and all "unfair" business prac-
tices.6 Enforcement was vested in the first modern American inde-
pendent administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC").69 Starting with the 1897 case of ICC v. Cincinnati, New Or-
leans & Texas Pacific Railway,"° the Supreme Court manifested hos-
tility to the ICC by holding that the administrative agency was not
vested with the power to establish rates since Congress had neglected
to imbue it with such power." The Court stated:
It is not to be supposed that Congress would ever authorize
an administrative body to establish rates without inquiry
and examination .... [Ilt would be strange if an administra-
tive body could ... create for itself a power which Congress
had not given to it .... Our conclusion then is that Congress
has not conferred upon the commission the legislative power
of prescribing rates either maximum or minimum or abso-
lute."'
Later that year in ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway,73 the Court
rejected the ICC's interpretation of the Act's "special cases" exception
and held:
that competition between rival routes is one of the matters
road industry as a series of private business ventures operated by individual entrepre-
neurs or corporations with little public interest involved. See 2 MORISON, supra note 46,
at 75. In the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,
(1889), the U.S. Supreme Court expressly stated the view that the "reasonableness" of a
rate set by a Minnesota railroad commission was "eminently a question for judicial inves-
tigation." Id. at 457-58.
68. Prior to federal regulation of the railroads, in 1838 and again in 1852, Con-
gress had passed legislation that established an elaborate regulatory scheme for construc-
tion and maintenance of steamboat boilers, including regular testing and inspection of the
boilers. Rabin, supra note 25, at 1196.
69. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887). See also
Isaiah L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission: An Appraisal, 46 YALE L.J.
915 (1937); 2 MORISON, supra note 46, at 75. A cogent summary of the various scholarly
accounts and the political activity which culminated in the enactment of the Interstate
Commerce Act may be found in SKOWRONECK, supra note 25, at 125-150. Serving as the
archetype for the modern administrative agency, the ICC was vested with broad powers
of rule making and adjudication to regulate national industry. See SCHWAMRZ, supra note
37, § 1.10, at 21-22.
70. 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
71. Id. at 511.
72. Id. at 509-11.
73. 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
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which may lawfully be considered in making rates, and that
substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions may
justify common carriers in charging greater compensation for
the transportation of like kinds of property for a shorter than
for a longer distance over the same line."
The combined effect of Cincinnati and Midland was to undercut the
force and effectiveness of federal regulatory agencies.75 In Midland,
Justice Harlan dissented and expressed the view that:
Taken in connection with other decisions defining the powers
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the present deci-
sion, it seems to me, goes far to make that commission a
useless body for all practical purposes, and to defeat many of
the important objects designed to be accomplished by the
various enactments of Congress relating to interstate com-
merce.
76
By finding either that the congressional delegation was per se overly
broad or that an agency acted outside the parameters of a statutory
delegation, the Supreme Court retained final authority to determine
when a delegation of legislative power violated the constitutional
separation of powers doctrine. 7 While it refrained from expressly de-
daring null the power of the federal regulatory agency to police the
market, the Supreme Court upheld judicial review as the principal
means of determining the legitimate scope of administrative author-
ity.78
During this period as judicial review developed to reveal am-
bivalence about administrative power, the Supreme Court also re-
74. Id. at 170.
75. When the Supreme Court upheld government regulation, it has been sug-
gested that it was in the interest of the railroads themselves. See GABRIEL KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965) (indicting that railroads themselves were
the principal interest group that favored regulation). Kolko's theory has been critiqued as
too narrow an explanation of a complex historical reality. See, e.g., Henry Pucell, Ideas
and Interests: Businessmen and the ICC, 54 J. AMER. HIST. 568 (1967) (illustrating that
merchant shippers were the principal interest group); LEE BENSON, MERCHANTS,
FARMERS, & RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION AND NEW YORK POLITICS, 1850-1887
(1955) (demonstrating that the influence of New York merchants to gain a competitive
advantage was a primary factor that led to enactment of the ICC).
76. 168 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Congress would eventually pass legislation--the Hepburn Act in 1906 and
the Mann-Elkins Act in 1919--that made clear its intention to vest the ICC with full
power to police unfair competitive practices in the railroad industry. See Rabin, supra
note 25, at 1235.
78. The underlying constitutional issue is whether a particular delegation vio-
lates the constitutional requirement that "[aill legislative power herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress.... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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vealed its concern for individual autonomy. In Lochner v. New York,79
the Court invalidated a New York state statute that limited the num-
ber of hours a baker might work to sixty per week and ten per day.80
Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham championed the individ-
ual's subjective right to enter contracts over the limited scope of state
police power. Justice Peckham described the statutes such as the one
under review in Lochner as "mere meddlesome interferences with the
rights of the individual."8' Peckham's reasoning disclosed that gov-
ernment regulation was thought to be constitutionally suspect to the
extent that it hampered individual autonomy.
The constitutional values of personal autonomy and the suspicion
of administrative power were consistent with the Supreme Court's
laissez-faire perspective. A blatant example of laissez-faire perspec-
tive may be seen in the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,so when the Su-
preme Court struck down a federal law that prohibited interstate
commerce in products made by workers under fourteen years of age.83
The Court objected to the federal law on the ground that it exceeded
the power vested in Congress to regulate interstate commerce under
the Constitution, arguing that Section 8 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion provides that "Congress shall have the power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes .. .. "s' It reasoned that manufacturing was a
local matter and did not come under the purvey of the commerce
clause.' It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the Court's
attitude toward the new government regulation was entirely depend-
ent on the laissez-faire approach." It was clear, nonetheless, that the
79. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80. Id. at 64.
81. Id. at 61. Justice Holmes dissented arguing that no particular economic
philosophy was written into the Constitution, and that the New York law promoted a le-
gitimate protection of health by the state. Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
83. Id. at 276.
84. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). For a discussion of how the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the "commerce clause" has proved to be a
significant area of controversy in the history of the Supreme Court, see TRIBE, supra note
50, at 319-423.
85. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. Continuing his objection to the Court's laissez-
faire ideology, Justice Holmes dissented, arguing that the Constitution permitted Con-
gress substantial leeway to expand the field of regulatory control: "The national welfare
as understood by Congress may require a different attitude within its sphere from that of
some self-seeking state. It seems to me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its
understanding by all the means at its command." Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1236. The Supreme Court's approach to the
Sherman Antitrust Act also revealed ambivalence. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209 (1890). The language of the Act, passed by Congress in 1890, permitted room for
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Supreme Court viewed the individual as a kind of private entrepre-
neur whose subjective natural rights to own vast amounts of private
property or to enter into contracts to work long hours were protected
under the Constitution. Any government attempts to regulate the free
market were met with suspicion when they appeared to infringe on
individual rights. The Court's adherence to the pristine doctrine of the
modern liberal state--characterized by individual rights, a free market
and neutral government--was evident.
Despite the Supreme Court's hesitation to endorse wholeheart-
edly the form of regulatory government, a new theory of administra-
tive law was established by the dawn of the twentieth century. 7 In his
1916 Presidential Address to the American Bar Association, Elihu
Root presciently observed what the period was witnessing:
[T]he creation of a body of administrative law quite different
in its machinery, its remedies, and its necessary safeguards
from the old methods of regulation by specific statutes en-
forced by the courts. As any community passes from simple to
complex directions the only way in which government can deal
with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by the delega-
tion of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate agents,
subject to the control of general conditions prescribed by supe-
rior authority. The necessities of our situation have already
led to an extensive employment of that method .... [Tihe old
doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has
virtually retired from the field and given up the fight .... Yet
considerable interpretation. The Act declared illegal "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" and it pro-
scribed all activity to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any person or persons, to monopolize" any aspect of interstate or foreign commerce. §§ 1-
2, 26 Stat. 209. In the decade following the passage of the Act, the Court interpreted the
Act strictly to void the pooling arrangements of the railroads. See United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (invalidating agreement between competing
railroads to fix rates as a restraint of trade). At the same time, the Court refused to find
that the whiskey and sugar trusts violated the Act. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895).
87. FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,
FRANCE AND GERMANY 6-7 (1893) (noting that the French had developed a distinct system
of precepts which was known as droit administratif, Goodnow's treatise on comparative
administrative justice admonished that "the general failure in England and the United
States to recognize an administrative law is really due, not to the non-existence in these
countries of this branch of the law but rather to the well-known failure of English law
writers to classify the law"). ERNST FREUND, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SELECTED
DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS (1911). The 1911 publication of Freund's
casebook on administrative law indicated that the theory was considered an acceptable
aspect of law school study. Id.
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the powers that are committed to these regulatory agencies,
and which they must have to do their work, carry with them
great and dangerous opportunities of oppression and wrong. If
we are to continue a government of limited powers, these
agencies of regulation must themselves be regulated. The
limits of their power over the citizen must be fixed and deter-
mined. The rights of the citizen against them must be made
plain. A system of administrative law must be developed, and
that with us is still in its infancy, crude and imperfect.8
In 1927, Felix Frankfurter wrote that:
[t]he formulation and publication of executive orders and
rules and regulations are in this country still in a primitive
stage... [b]ut the range of control conferred by Congress...
upon subsidiary law-making bodies, variously denominated
as heads of departments, commissions and boards, pene-
trates in the United States... the whole gamut of human af-
fairs.89
As this historical period drew to its end, "administrative agencies as a
device of government had been effectively established," and "adminis-
trative procedure as a body of law carrying its own principles and
philosophy largely awaited recognition and development."'  To sup-
plement the nondelegation doctrine, a collateral theory of "govern-
ment necessity" was developed to uphold the increasing delegation of
government powers to administrative agencies." Suspicion of gov-
ernment power and concern for individual autonomy would continue
to play a role as the principles and philosophy of the new administra-
tive justice emerged.
88. Elihu Root, 'Public Service by the Bar,' Address of the President, REPORT OF
THE 39TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHICAGO, ILL., AUG. 30,
31 AND SEPT. 1, 1916, 368 (1916).
89. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614,
614 (1927).
90. Jerry S. Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the Federal Administrative Agen-
cies--And Beyond, 29 FED. BARJ. 267, 268 (1970).
91. See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding Con-
gressional authority to delegate to the President the power to increase or decrease tariffs).
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: FROM SUSPICION
TO DEFERENCE AND THE REFASHIONED AUTONOMY
The Supreme Court's review of New Deal regulatory programs
marked a major transition in the development of administrative law.'
The Supreme Court's initial pronouncements on the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act ("NIRA") and the Agricultural Adjustment Act
("AAA") reflected suspicion of administrative action. 3 In May 1935,
the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA in a sweeping and unani-
mous decision in the landmark case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States.94 Schechter stemmed from a suit brought by the opera-
tors of a kosher slaughterhouse in New York City, who had been con-
victed of violating the Live Poultry Code, which had been established
pursuant to Title I of the NIRA 5 The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction and invalidated Title I of the NIRA on the ground that the
Act represented a virtual unlimited extension of government regula-
tory power over private business.9 In addition, the Court reasoned
that the idea of private business groups developing their own feder-
ally enforceable codes usurped the proper legislative function of the
Congress.97 Such activity, the Court declared, violated the nondelega-
tion doctrine.
98
92. Comprehensive historical analysis of the New Deal may be found in: 2
MORISON, supra note 46, at 299-328; PAUL K. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL (1967); ELLIS W.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY, A STUDY IN ECONOMIC
AMBIVALENCE-(1966); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEw DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963).
93. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), and Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933). See also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a portion of the NIRA as an overly broad delegation of
legislative power).
94. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 388 (1935). One interpre-
tation of cases such as is that they represent a second ideological undercurrent to the
New Deal. Pursuant to this interpretation, hostility to delegation was merely a "constitu-
tional cover" for hostility to the New Deal's economic and social objectives. Cf. KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 11 (3d Ed. 1994).
95. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 519. Title I of the NIRA prescribed the drafting and
application of codes by representative industry groups to achieve multiple objectives in-
cluding the facilitation of economic recovery and reform, the cessation of child labor
through the establishment of a minimum age, and the creation of collective bargaining
agreements. The various codes were to constitute federally enforceable standards for each
industry. If an industry failed to adopt such a code, the law granted the President the
authority to promulgate a code of his own making. In all, more than seven hundred in-
dustries were codified, and approximately twenty-three million workers fell within the
scope of the various codes. 2 MORISON, supra note 46, at 306.
96. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 553.
97. Id. at 527.
98. Id. Arguably, Schechter seems to have been the only nondelegation decision
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Consistent with its approach in Schechter, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Butler" declared the AAA unconstitutional on the
ground that once again the Congress had exceeded the constitutional
limits of the government's regulatory authority.' 0 Processors of farm
products, who were taxed under the AAA to pay for the government
subsidies to farmers, challenged the Act under the general welfare
clause of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. 10 The Section, which
empowers Congress to tax for the purpose of raising funds for the na-
tion's debts and for the general welfare, states in relevant part: 'The
Congress shall have [plower [t]o lay and collect [t]axes, [d]uties,
[i]mposts, and [eixcises, to pay the [d]ebts and provide for the common
[dlefence and general [w]elfare of the United States.'1 2 The general
welfare, the Butler Court delineated, did not include the regulation of
agriculture through a tax on processors to pay subsidies to farmers.
1 0 3
The Court's initial suspicion of regulatory power was manifested
not only in the separation and delegation doctrines, but in a concern
for personal autonomy. In Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,04 the
Court struck down a New York minimum-wage law for women.15
Reminiscent of the Lochner reasoning, to reach the result in More-
head, a five-member majority of the Court relied on the freedom to
contract theory. The Court stated:
The right to make contracts about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty protected by the due process clause. Within this liberty
are provisions of contracts between employer and employee
to have survived the eventual seat change at the Supreme Court. See JAFFE, supra note
14, at 66.
99. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
100. Id. at 78. Congress passed the AAA in order to rectify the problem of wide-
spread farm foreclosures caused by an enormous surplus of farm products and abysmally
low prices paid to farmers for their produce. The Act authorized the Department of Agri-
culture to pay farmers for destroying certain surplus commodities such as wheat, cotton
and tobacco, and certain livestock such as pigs and cows, and for reducing the future
planting and breeding. 2 MORISON, supra note 46, at 307. Like the NIRA, the Act was
enormously successful in achieving its end. For example, tobacco growers, who had re-
ceived forty-two million dollars for their 1933 crop, netted one hundred twenty million in
1934 for a smaller crop. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
102. Id.
103. 297 U.S. at 65. In contrast to the Schechter decision, the Butler majority did
not enjoy unanimity among the nine Justices. In a stinging dissent, Justice Stone warned
his colleagues against a "tortured construction of the Constitution," which overlooks that
"[clourts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have the capac-
ity to govern." Id. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting).
104. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
105. Id.
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fixing the wages to be paid. In making contracts of employ-
ment, generally speaking, the parties have equal right to ob-
tain from each other the best terms they can by private bar-
gaining. Legislative abridgment of that freedom can only be
justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances. Free-
dom of contract is the general rule and restraint the excep-
tion. 1
0 6
Despite the pressing economic hardships that the New York law pro-
grams were designed to alleviate, the Supreme Court seemed deter-
mined to protect individual autonomy through the subjective rights
language of freedom of contract and private property.
0 7
Within a year of the Morehead decision, however, the Supreme
Court reversed its course in the case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish."8
Notwithstanding its prior decisions in Lochner and in Morehead
striking down maximum hour and minimum wage laws,'09 in West
Coast Hotel the Court upheld a New York statute that provided such
protection to working women."10 The Court predicated the shift on "re-
cent economic experience" which demonstrated "[tihe exploitation of a
class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bar-
gaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial
of a living wage.. . ."I" No longer was the freedom to contract, which
had served as the basis of the Lochner rational, paramount in the
Court's evaluation. Instead, the Court now recognized the legitimacy
of the legislature's efforts to protect an exploited class of workers from
employers who were in a superior bargaining position."2 All that was
required to affect the dramatic shift was the vote of Justice Roberts
who voted with the five-member majority in both the Morehead and
West Coast Hotel decisions.
1'3
106. Id. at 610-611.
107. The Supreme Court's rejection of several of the New Deal's most prominent
programs caused considerable political turmoil, and President Roosevelt threatened to in-,
crease the number of Justices on the Court so as to appoint Justices in tune with his pro-
gram. For a detailed discussion of the controversy, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing'Plan, SUP. Cr. REV. 347 (1966).
108. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
109. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a Dis-
trict of Columbia minimum wage law).
110. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
111. Id. at 399.
112. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1260.
113. Confronted with the Roosevelt threat to achieve the ends of the New Deal,
the shift was referred to euphemistically as "the switch in time which saved nine." See
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). See also Rabin, su-
pra note 25, at 1261.
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The shift in language from individual freedom of contract to the
protection of a class of exploited individuals represented a redefined
notion of individual autonomy. The Court was apparently now willing
to mitigate its adherence to the pristine notion of the liberal state
characterized by the economic rights of the individual as entrepre-
neur, market autonomy, and neutral government. Implicit in the shift
was recognition of the reality that not all individuals compete on an
even playing field when the market is left to develop without govern-
ment regulation. The Court recognized a state's legitimate interest in
regulation that protected individual workers from the exploitation of
an industry. While the goal of the Court remained the protection of
the individual person, the Court had expanded the notion of auton-
omy. The limited parameters of the nineteenth-century view of the
individual as entrepreneur, who enjoyed great liberty in entering into
contracts, was transformed to encompass the class of individuals
whose economic well being was now dependent on a certain level of
government regulation through administrative agencies.
114
Along with the refashioning of the notion of autonomy, judicial
suspicion of administrative power shifted to judicial deference. In
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin,"5 the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") against the familiar argument that steel
manufacturing was local and did not constitute a valid exercise of
congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause."8 Articu-
lating a new and expansive conception of the government regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Hughes stated in
the majority opinion:
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate com-
merce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for
'Its protection and advancement .... That power is plenary
and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no matter
what the source of the dangers which threaten it." Although
114. Cf C.R. SUNSTIEN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 322-326 (1997) (sug-
gesting that the democratic aspiration of the New Deal were defeated since centralized
national government actually diminished opportunities for citizens to participate and
promoted unproductive struggles between well organized factions).
115. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
116. Id. at 49. With the demise of the NIRA, President Roosevelt called for the es-
tablishment of a National Labor Relations Board, which would be empowered to police
unfair labor practices throughout the industrial sector. Essentially, the NLRA was an ini-
tiative that recognized organized labor as a countervailing force to big business. National
Labor Relations Act, ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Through this legislation the federal
government afforded the legitimacy to organized labor that it had long afforded under
traditional common law notions of private property and contract to big business. See
HAWLEY, supra note 92, at 195.
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activities may be intrastate in character when separately con-
sidered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appro-
priate to protect that commerce from the burdens and obstruc-
tions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control.'17
A new era had dawned for the administrative agencies in the legiti-
mate exercise of government regulatory authority.1 8 A series of cases
followed in which the Supreme Court upheld various New Deal pro-
grams including, inter alia, the Social Security Act and the re-enacted
A.AA. 119
While the Supreme Court was firmly committed to the availabil-
ity of judicial review of agency actions to individuals who incurred
injury to a legal right, the limited scope of the review permitted the
administrative agencies wide latitude. In the case of NLRB v. Hearst
Publications Inc.,'2" the Court adopted a highly deferential attitude
towards administrative agency action. 2 ' Newspaper publisher Wil-
liam Hearst appealed from a determination by the National Labor
Relations Board that required him to enter into collective bargaining
with a union that represented newsboys.2 2 Disputing the finding of
the Board that the newsboys were "employees" within the meaning of
the NLRA, Hearst contended that the newsboys were private contrac-
tors. Upon judicial review of the Board's determination, the Supreme
Court deferred to the Board's expertise and upheld the determina-
tion.123  Both socio-economic necessity and institutional self-
preservation may be underlying factors that led to the mitigation of a
strict application of pristine liberal theory from the New Deal to the
post-war era. The Supreme Court expanded the parameters of the
class of individuals whose personal autonomy enjoyed protection by
legal rights. At the same time, the expanded parameters also weak-
117. Jones, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
118. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 94, at 12-13.
119. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the
Social Security Act); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the AAA); and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act). By
the late 1930s, the New Deal's administrative government was an established feature on
the landscape of American government. As the economic conditions that the New Deal
had initially addressed became less pressing, the focus shifted from the issue of the le-
gitimacy of government regulation to scrutiny of the procedure through which the vast
federal bureaucracy reached decisions. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1264.
120. 322 U.S. 111(1944).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 130.
123. Id.
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ened the strident language of individual entrepreneurial rights by
placing them in balance with the notion of the larger societal good.
Concomitant with the post World War II expansion of govern-
ment bureaucracy, there was an increase in the number of appeals
brought by individuals seeking judicial review of administrative
acts.'2 In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court delineated the avail-
ability of review through standing requirements. The Court held in
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,'25 that a taxpayer did not enjoy standing
to sue a federal agency that had granted financial aid to municipal
electrical power companies.1 26 The taxpayer's claim, the Court rea-
soned, amounted to "a clear case of damnum absque injuria.'127 In
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,'28 the Court interpreted statu-
tory language that granted judicial review to "persons aggrieved" by
an FCC license determination to include the competitor of the licen-
see.1 2 ' The Court held in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co."' that standing to
challenge an agency action required some "legal right" which must be
"shown to have been invaded or threatened in the complaint."'' Thus,
a claim of some competitive injury that was based merely on financial
damage or loss of income as a result of the agency action, and not on a
legal right, did not suffice to satisfy the threshold requirement of
standing to bring the recourse."2
Subsequent to World War II, Congress passed the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 ("APA'."13 A central feature fashioned by Con-
124. FINAL REPORT OF THE A'rrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 57, at 9-11.
125. 302 U.S. 464(1938).
126. Id. at 475.
127. Id. at 479.
128. 309 U.S. 470 (1940)
129. Id.
130. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
131. Id. at 125 (Standing to sue the agency may be recognized, outside the right
to sue created by the statute, when an individual alleges a violation of some other recog-
nized legal right.).
132. Only in Sanders did the Court acknowledge that the plaintiff has standing to
sue when the statute at issue expressly created standing for those "aggrieved or whose in-
terests are adversely affected." Sanders, 309 U.S. at 476-77 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6)
(1982)).
133. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1947); current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1996). See generally,
Martin Shapiro, APA" Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986). In 1938, Roscoe
Pound chaired a special committee on administrative justice under the auspices of the
American Bar Association. The committee concluded that the individualization of justice
would be well served by adopting several traditional judicial procedures. These included
adequate notice to concerned parties, a hearing before reaching a decision, decisions
based on the record and not on matters extraneous to the case, respect for jurisdictional
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gress in the new legislation addresses the procedure for agency rule
making. The APA required that an agency afford preliminary notice of
a proposed rule, opportunity for public comment, and a statement of
the basis and purpose for a rule."M Another important area addressed
by Congress was agency adjudication.Y The APA entitled an individ-
ual, suffering a legal wrong due to an agency action, to review by the
agency itself, and then by the federal courts if necessary.13 6 In ad-
dressing both agency rule making and adjudicatory functions, Con-
gress fashioned administrative law along the traditional procedures
employed by the courts to resolve conflicts between individuals and
government officials. 37 The APA was designed to ensure fairness and
consistency in the treatment of individuals, and to confine the deci-
limitations, clarification of the roles of advocate, prosecutor, and judge, and distinguishing
the functions of investigation, prosecution, and rule making. See Report of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ABA REP. 331, 346-351 (1938). These conclusions
are summarized in a slightly different form in Rabin, supra note 25, at 1264. For a critical
discussion of the ABA Report, see Louis J. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Adminis-
trative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1236-42 (1939).
134. 60 Stat. at 239. In the wake of the APA's adoption, Henry Hart, Albert
Sacks, and Louis Jaffe, advocated that the administrative agency should have broad law-
making authority. Given the complexity of modern society, Congress has no choice but to
delegate a large dose of discretion to administrative agencies to make findings of fact and
to draw conclusions of law. The determination of an agency should only be overturned
when the reviewing court becomes convinced that the administrative action falls outside
the parameters of the "clear purpose" of the statute that the agency seeks to implement.
This school of thought accepts congressional delegation of legislative power to administra-
tive agencies as long as the delegating statute expresses a clear purpose. A reviewing
court should uphold administrative action up to the point at which the court becomes
convinced that the purpose of the statute is contradicted. Moreover, an exercise of legisla-
tive power by an administrative agency enjoys a presumption of falling within the
agency's discretion. See Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, Materials On the Legal Process 1-24,
212-25 (unpublished manuscript, 1958); JAFFE, supra note 14, at 572-76; Louis J. Jaffe,
The Illusion of The Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973). Other contempo-
rary commentators also embrace the approach advocated by Professor Jaffe as at least a
partial solution to the nondelegation issue. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985). Like many contemporary
mainstream commentators, who are eclectic in approach to the nondelegation problem,
Professor Diver agrees with aspects of the "interest group remedy" proffered by Professor
Richard Stewart. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HARV. L. REV. 393, 423-24 (1981).
135. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1205
[hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT] ("It provides... the requirements for administra-
tive hearings and decisions in cases in which statutes require such hearings.').
136. 60 Stat. at 243; see also HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 135, at 1205
("It sets forth a simplified statement of judicial review designed to afford a remedy for
every legal wrong.'.
137. See HOUSE JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 135, at 1205 ("[T]he provisions for
judicial review afford parties a method for enforcing their rights in proper cases.').
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The revised approach to judicial review seemed to allay the sus-
picion of government power reflected in the separation of powers and
nondelegation doctrines. The new direction of judicial review was a
realistic response to the reality that large-scale doses of Congressional
delegation of legislative, executive and judicial power to administra-
tive agencies are a necessary aspect of modern government.139 Once
the Court accepted the new arrangement of administrative govern-
ment, the modified understanding of the traditional doctrines re-
quired that an administrative agency act within parameters contem-
plated by Congress.14 The role of the judiciary was not to substitute
its own judgments about issues of public policy but rather to ascertain
that agency decisions remained consistent with the Congressional in-
tent. 14 Judicial deference to administrative action seemed to reach its
138. See id. ("The bill is an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures..
It affords private parties a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may
protect them, while giving a simple framework upon which to base such operations as are
subject to the provisions of the bill.').
139. Cf Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding a system of war-
time price controls against a delegation doctrine challenge); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding a Congressional statute that authorized a commission to
create sentencing guidelines); Loving v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1737 (1996) (upholding a
statute that authorized the President to determine a list of aggravating factors that would
merit the imposition of the death penalty in court martials).
140. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 31 ("The changed judicial attitude encour-
aged Congress... to make broader delegations to agencies than had formerly been their
want.").
141. Starting with the New Deal and continuing into the 1960s, faith in the abil-
ity of administrative government to address the ills of society reached its zenith. By the
advent of the 1960s, administrative agencies were executing a bewildering variety of
functions in American society in areas as diverse as: education, mental and physical
health, natural resources, transportation, government benefits, housing, energy and im-
migration. The agencies exercised authority through promulgating rules, conducting in-
spections, issuing licenses and adjudicating grievances by private individuals. When Lyn-
don B. Johnson assumed the Presidency after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, he
inherited the blueprints for a War on Poverty which he declared in his program the Great
Society. On the development of the War on Poverty and the Great Society, see James L.
Sundquist, Origins of the War on Poverty in ON FIGHTING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM
EXPERIENCE 1-18 (James L. Sundquist, ed., 1969). Johnson's program aimed at a verita-
ble mlange of social problems such as blighted neighborhoods, race relations, housing,
mental health care, education and juvenile delinquency. The centerpiece of the program
was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508 (1964). At the core of the pro-
gram was the concept of "community action" through which government administrative
agencies were to enlist "maximum feasible participation" among the poor. For a critical
discussion of this approach, see generally DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDING, COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY (1969). The underlying
theory of the program was that federal agency action would penetrate into the grass roots
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summit in United States v. Morgan."4 2 In an earlier appeal in the same
case, the Supreme Court had remanded to the federal trial court with
instructions to depose the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
regarding the basis of his decision making process. Alarmed by the
lower court's aggressive implementation of its order, the Supreme
Court admonished that it was not within the parameters of judicial
review to 'probe the mental processes of the Secretary.' 143 Rather, the
Court held that the decision making process of an administrative offi-
cial under scrutiny was entitled to the same level of respect as that
shown to a judge.
The Supreme Court seemed committed to a high level of defer-
ence to administrative actions upon judicial review. First, it promul-
gated a standing requirement limiting the availability of judicial re-
view of an administrative action to one who suffered an injury to a le-
gal right.'4 Next, the scope of review of administrative action was
highly deferential to agency expertise.145 Pursuant to the APA, the
Supreme Court permitted the administrative agencies wide discre-
tion.146 Further, the Court required that upon scrutiny of the decision
making process of those who exercised administrative power, defer-
ence similar to that shown to the judge's decision making process be
shown. 147 A final factor demonstrating judicial deference was that
even when a federal court found an abuse of discretion, rather than
substitute its own judgment, it remanded the case to the administra-
tive authority.
148
of American society. In the tradition of Roosevelt's New Deal, the Johnson administration
seemed intent on creating societal utopia through an ever-expanding list of specialized
government programs. Although the federal administrative agencies appeared to be "em-
boldened" by the optative attitude about government, the hermeneutics of autonomy and
suspicion were about to reemerge. Rabin, supra note 25, at 1296. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS (1962).
142. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
143. Id. at 422.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
145. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 31 ("One consideration cut across the sys-
tem of administrative law that the courts were constructing: deference to the administra-
tive expert.").
146. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996).
147. U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) ("[Allthough the administrative
process has had a different development and pursues somewhat different ways from the
courts, they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropri-
ate independence of each should be respected by the other.").
148. Another perspective on judicial review was afforded by Kenneth Culp Davis.
See 5 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 392-404. Davis observed that courts were free to adopt a
standard of review that simply inquired as to whether an agency decision was reasonable
or to substitute their own independent judgment about the outcome of a given case. Id.
The problem with this approach, according to Davis, was the lack of consistent guidelines
[Vol. 38
20011 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 115
POWER
The propensity of the Court to call into question the legitimacy of
administrative agency action at the start of the New Deal had been
supplanted by a pervasive sense of judicial deference in the post-
World War II era."9 One explanation for the shift may be found in the
dire economic plight of the nation during the Great Depression. The
Court adopted a "broad interpretation of the commerce, taxing and
general welfare clauses of the Constitution ... which made possible
the application of the Constitution to an industrialized nation. '""w The
proliferation of administrative agencies was required for the stimula-
tion and regulation of the market to produce certain goods and serv-
ices that could be enjoyed by the public at large.51 Additionally, these
specialized administrative agencies were better equipped than the
Congress to provide the "continuous expert supervision" required by
the complexities of economic well-being in the modern democracy. 15 A
second explanation indicates that institutional self-preservation led to
the shift. Only when they were confronted with President Roosevelt's
plan to pack the Court did the Justices appreciate that the political
landscape had been transformed so that the established interests of
big business were supplanted by a new more powerful set of self-
interests. 53 The Court's own political credibility, perhaps survival,
depended on its willingness to jettison the laissez-faire approach in
favor of expanded administrative government.'"
about whether the court chooses the deferential standard of review or the stringent one.
Id. He proposed that predictability of outcomes would be enhanced if the court would de-
termine the comparative competence of the administrative or judicial body to reach a cor-
rect result in a given case. Id. The comparison could be based on factors already consid-
ered by the courts such as agency consistency over a long period of time, whether the
agency or the court exercises a special competence over the subject matter of the case,
whether the issue involves an interpretation of law or a finding of fact, and whether the
agency-exercised delegation is consistent with the statute under which Congress empow-
ered it. Id. On the basis of this comparison of whether the administrative agency or the
court was better qualified to reach a particular determination, the court would then
choose either the deferential or the strict standard of judicial review. Id.
149. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1271-72; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at
31.
150. See 2 MORISON, supra note 46, at 322.
151. See CASS, supra note 59, at 8.
152. See WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISrATIVE PROCEEDINGS 9 (1941).
153. See Fireside Chat by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (national radio broad-
cast, Mar. 9, 1937); see e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
154. See Aman, supra note 25, at 1113-14 (1988) (discussing Roosevelt's "court-
packing" speech and its connection to change in judicial decision making); Sandra B.
Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State:
Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 960 (2000) (noting that "Roosevelt dropped
his 'court-packing' plan, however, when one Justice 'switched' and cast his vote ... !).
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These divergent, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, explana-
tions of the Court's shift may also be applied to the period of judicial
deference to administrative decision making that followed World War
II. On the one hand, socio-economic necessity justified the Court's def-
erence to administrative regulation and expertise within certain lim-
ited spheres entrusted to the agency. At the same time, the enactment
of the APA may be understood as the result of "a highly conventional
lawyer's view of how to tame potentially unruly administrators."' 5
The Court's imprimatur of the APA advanced the Court's own self-
interest, since the Act confirmed the role of judicial review of the ex-
ercise of administrative power.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY
AND OSCILLATION BETWEEN SUSPICION AND DEFERENCE
As the size of the federal bureaucracy grew in the 1960s, public
concern about government obligations to individual citizens became
more acute.156 In an influential article, Charles Reich argued that the
pervasive influence of government in American life required that in-
dividual property rights or interests be created in the wide host of
government services, benefits, contracts, franchises and licenses. 57
Traditionally, many government positions and benefits were consid-
ered privileges granted to an individual, and such privileges did not
155. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1265.
156. See James 0. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 307-09 (1976); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1279-80 (1984); Aman, supra note 25, at 1103-11.
Following the Vietnam War, a national upsurge of interest in the issues of health, safety,
conservation, environment and consumerism contributed to yet another expansion in
American administrative justice. To address these areas of concern, increased govern-
ment regulation through agency rule making (often involving a high level of technological
and economic expertise) was necessary. Rabin, supra note 25, at 1279-95. Given their vast
influence and power over the lives of most Americans, "basic public trust in the adminis-
trative process and the spirit of working partnership between agency and reviewing
courts that had developed in the postwar period began to disintegrate." For one explana-
tion of this distrust, see James Q. Wilson, BUREAUCRACY 68 (1989) ("Bureaucracies will in
time acquire a distinctive personality or culture that will shape the attitudes of people
who join these organizations .... There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the po-
litical views of bureaucrats tend to correspond to their agency affiliation. . . .'). See also
Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. PUB. POL. &
MANAGEMENT 369 (1991) ("Americans want government power to do more, but govern-
ment power is fragmented and mistrusted. So Americans seek to achieve their goals by
simultaneously demanding more government and by fragmenting it and regulating it still
further.'.
157. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-87 (1964). For
another influential article at this time period, see also Henry Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268-71 (1965) (describing the unprecedented expan-
sion of procedural norms at that time period).
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constitute legally protected rights.58 Justice Holmes had expressed
the traditional understanding with his often quoted dictum, in up-
holding the firing of a police officer for political activities, that "[t]he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 59 The government role was
akin to that of a private donor who could withdraw, or impose condi-
tions upon, a gift at will. Reich's argument called the traditional dis-
tinction between right and privilege into doubt. According to his ap-
proach, government entitlements were to constitute the "new prop-
erty," in order to safeguard 'the troubled boundary between the indi-
vidual man and the state."'6
In the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,' 61 the Supreme Court
seemed to abandon the traditional distinction. 62 Welfare recipients in
New York claimed that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause
for the state to deprive them of welfare benefits without first con-
ducting a formal hearing." The Court held that the welfare benefits
in question constituted a statutory entitlement rather than a mere
privilege, and therefore, due process required the conduct of a judi-
cial-type hearing prior to termination of such benefits.' M Following
Goldberg, the Supreme Court reached a number of decisions that af-
firmed the right to due process in connection with government enti-
tlements. '1
However, optimism about the "new property" created on the basis
of due process rights was soon tempered. In Matthews v. Eldridge,'"
the Supreme Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not required
prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits. 6 7 The
158. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46,57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ('[Tihe [Djue [P]rocess [C]lause does not apply to the
holding of a government office.'). Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)
("[Wihere governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of
the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the government's case
must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is un-
true.').
159. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
160. Reich, supra note 157, at 742.
161. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
162. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
163. Id. at 256-57.
164. Id. at 263-64.
165. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Due process required that high
school students who disrupted class and physically attacked a police officer be afforded a
hearing before being suspended from school.); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985) (dismissed security guard at a public school who lied on his employment
application had a right to a hearing prior to termination of employment).
166. 424 U.S. 319(1976).
167. Id. at 349.
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Court identified three factors that must be balanced in determining
the extent of due process to be afforded a recipient of a government
benefit prior to the termination of the benefit. 16 The balancing test
required consideration of the private interest injured by the adminis-
trative action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the entitlement and
the probable value of additional or substitute procedures, and the
public interest including financial and administrative burden that ad-
ditional due process would entail.1 6 9 It has been suggested that the
"new property" ultimately was doomed to fail since, under the guise of
respect for individual autonomy, it failed to provide any type of moral
basis for the promotion of a "conscientious pattern of conduct." Rather
than advance individual autonomy, programs of government largess




During the 1960s, the federal circuit courts also became suspi-
cious that the administrative agencies were exhibiting a bias in favor
of politically influential constituents.'17 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia addressed the issue in Office of Communica-
tions of the United Church of Christ v. FCC.17 The appellant, United
Church of Christ, sought standing to challenge the decision of the
FCC to grant a renewal of a license to a Jackson, Mississippi televi-
sion station which had engaged in a number of discriminatory prac-
tices, such as cutting off a network program on race relations when a
representative of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People was about to speak.'7 3 The appellant also claimed that
the television station had illegally discriminated against the local
Roman Catholic Church.174 The D.C. Circuit held that the appellant
had standing to challenge the administrative action on the ground
that it was within the public interest for the administrative agency to
hold a public hearing to hear the complaints of discrimination.175 Since
the FCC had failed to conduct such a hearing prior to its determina-
tion to renew the license, the Circuit Court revoked the license.1 76 A1-
168. Id. at 335.
169. Id.
170. See Robert Rabin, The Administrative State and Its Excesses: Reflections of
the New Property, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 273 (1990).
171. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1296. It was difficult, however, to demonstrate
that the so-called "captive agencies" showed a consistent bias in favor of certain politically
influential constituents, however. See Louis J. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Adminis-
trative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1954).
172. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
173. Id. at 997.
174. See id. at 997-98.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1006-07, 1009.
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though the FCC restored the license after conducting the proper pub-
lic hearing, the decision had far reaching consequences for the rela-
tionship between the federal courts and the administrative agen-
cies.' No longer would the federal courts simply defer to agency ex-
pertise.
The renewal of suspicion had been presaged by the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission.17 The Federal
Power Commission (FPC) had granted Consolidated Edison of New
York a license to construct a hydroelectric power plant at Storm King
Mountain on the Hudson River.1 7e Prior to granting the license, the
administrative agency had held a truncated public hearing at which it
refused, inter alia, to hear evidence on the environmental impact of
the power plant.ss On appeal, the Second Circuit seriously questioned
the agency's expertise in the conduct of the hearing.'8' The agency had
failed, in the Court's opinion, to consider adequately the public inter-
ests at large rather than those of the regulated party.82 Reversing the
administrative act of granting the license, the federal court rejected
the FPC's narrowly focused process of approving the license and re-
quired a full hearing to assess the project's impact on the river site's
natural forms of life, scenic beauty, and historical value.
83
As in Church of Christ, an erosion of faith in agency expertise
was apparent. Concomitant with the rise in administrative agencies,
judicial review was becoming more active.' Among the most promi-
177. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1039, 1059-60 (1997) (discussing the beginning of the criticism of adminis-
trative agencies around 1967); Rabin, supra note 25, at 1298 (noting the Court's changing
attitude toward administrative agencies and the activist judicial review that emerged).
178. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
179. ld. at 611.
180. See id. at 618-19, 623-24.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 620.
183. See id. at 612-13.
184. Stewart, supra note 27, at 1668, 1756-85. In a 1975 article, Richard Stewart
suggested that the inclusion of proper "interest group representation" would serve to as-
sure that administrative agencies act within the parameters of statutory delegation. Id.
Such interest groups, Stewart argued, must have the right to participate in the agency
decision making process and to have their various perspectives adequately considered by
the agency in that process. Id. Through judicial scrutiny of the administrative process,
administrative agencies can be required to provide opportunities for participation and
adequate consideration of interest groups in decisions that affect them. Id. The judicial
branch affords greater interest group participation by reliance upon liberal notions of due
process and standing. In facilitating the representation of various societal interests in
administrative justice, the courts help to overcome the problems caused by the break-
down of the traditional model's governance through consent. Id. See also STEPHEN G.
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nent of the decisions reflecting the new judicial focus on individual
rights was that of the D. C. Circuit in Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC." The case involved a sixteen-year struggle to determine the
licensee to operate a television station in Boston.'8 Circuit Judge
Harold Leventhal stated that the federal court would intervene in an
agency decision if it "becomes aware, especially through a combination
of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at
the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned deci-
sion making."' 87 Through a critique of the agency decision making pro-
cess, the so-called "hard look" doctrine manifests judicial suspicion of
administrative government.ss
The Supreme Court adopted the renewed suspicion in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe."'8 James Volpe, Secretary of the
Department of Transportation, approved federal funding for a high-
way to be constructed through Overton Park in Memphis. Federal law
prohibited the use of federal funds for road construction through pub-
lic parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative existed."9 Since he
was not required to do so under federal law, the Secretary reached his
determination without conducting a public hearing on the issue. The
lack of a formal hearing, or record thereof, meant that on appeal of
the Secretary's determination, the Supreme Court had only the affi-
davit of the Secretary upon which to review the matter. 19' Not willing
to defer to the Secretary's expertise, the Court reversed the determi-
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 378 (1982); Diver, supra note 134, at 423-24.
185. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
186. Id. at 844.
187. Id. at 851.
188. See Zellmer, supra note 154, at 999-1000 (discussing "hard look" analysis
and the various degrees to which it has been employed to take a closer look at agency ac-
tions). In contrast to the traditional model of judicial scrutiny, another approach stresses
technocratic expertise and "bureaucratic rationality." In a comprehensive analysis of so-
cial security disability insurance, Mashaw focused on the question of "mass justice" in the
administrative state. Mashaw contended that the courts "are truly incompetent to deal
with the complexities and subtleties of engineering and managing a large administrative
decision process." He argued that carefully designed organizational routines and man-
agement methods, as opposed to the tradition of judicial review of administrative action,
constituted the most effective guarantor of administrative justice. As applied to disability
benefits, it would be the role of the legislature to set the values and goals, and the role of
administrative agency to adjudicate individual cases consistent with the legislative direc-
tives. This remedy envisions clear judgments from the Congress on questions of value,
and cost-effective administrative adjudication of individual claims consistent with the
legislative value judgments. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAuCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 193, 225 (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management
Side of Due Process, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1994).
189. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
190. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
191. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 409.
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nation and remanded the case to the federal district court to conduct
fact finding since a reconstruction of the Secretary's decision making
process was essential to a proper judicial review of the determina-
tion. 192 The federal courts decided a number of cases that followed the
reasoning of Overton Park.'93
The 1978 case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council" signaled a return to judicial deference. In
Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court addressed the issue as to
whether the judiciary may impose additional procedural safeguards
during the rule making process than those required by the APA.1
95
The issue arose when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) con-
ducted rule making proceedings to assess the environmental conse-
quences of spent nuclear fuel. Rather than offer the opportunity for
formal, trial-like proceedings as envisioned in sections 556 and 557 of
the APA, the AEC elected an intermediate route, and permitted
somewhat more formal proceedings than those de minimis require-
ments for informal rule making under section 553.'9 The Supreme
Court held that agencies were required only to afford the minimum
extent of due process as stipulated in the relevant provision of the
APA. 197 The judiciary, the Court reasoned, could not substitute its
judgment for that of Congress as expressed in the APA.9 5
By the start of the 1980s, the system of having a large number of
central administrative authorities, each possessing objective compe-
tence and expertise to promulgate far reaching rules, was well estab-
lished. 19 When Ronald Reagan became President in January 1981, he
192. Id. at 420-21.
193. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (holding
that the federal administrative agency must consider protection of worker health and
safety to be the paramount value under the Occupational Safety and Health Act); TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (overturning administrative approval of a multimillion dol-
lar dam project); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(overturning the environmental standard established by the administrative agency and
remanding to the agency for a more adequate explanation of the basis of the agency's rule
making).
194. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
195. Id. at 525.
196. Id. at 535. The Court noted that the AEC followed section 553 and additional
procedures in the rule making process. Id.
197. Id. at 547-48. The Court indicated that a court may not overturn an adminis-
trative ruling on grounds of inadequate procedure "so long as the Commission employed
at least the statutory minima, a matter about which there is no doubt in this case." Id. at
548.
198. See id. at 544-45 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
199. See Peter J. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United
States, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE, ANGLO-AMERICAN AND NORDIC
SYSTEMS 614-647 (Aldo Piras ed., 1991).
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proposed that a certain degree of deregulation was necessary to re-
spond to the new demands of an increasingly global economy.2 °°
Global competition in a free-market economy, it was argued, required
that regional or national regulation of industry not unfairly burden a
domestic industry against its foreign competitors. Regan's program-
matic deregulation set the stage for one of the most significant cases
ever handed down by the Supreme Court concerning judicial review of
administrative action. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. ,20 the Supreme Court held that, if Congress ex-
pressly or implicitly delegated law interpreting power to the agency,
the Court must follow any reasonable agency interpretation of an am-
biguous statute."2 Reagan had ordered the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to repeal the rule promulgated during Jimmy Carter's
presidency that established stringent air pollution controls under the
Clean Air Act. Pursuant to the directives of the Reagan administra-
tion, the EPA introduced the so-called "bubble concept," whereby an
entire plant rather than an individual facility in the plant was consid-
ered the source of the air pollution.20 3 The Reagan administration
sought to justify the repeal on the ground that such stringent regula-
tion placed an unfair burden on American industries competing in a
global economy.204 Although the net effect of the bubble concept was to
lessen the stringency of the Clean Air Act, the Court in Chevron de-
ferred to the EPA's interpretation of the Act.20
6
In reaching its conclusion, the Chevron Court identified a two-
part analysis.20 6 The first question upon judicial review of an agency
interpretation of a statute asks whether the congressional intent be-
hind the statutory provision is clear.20 7 An affirmative answer requires
both the court and administrative agency to yield to the clear legisla-
tive intent.208 When congressional intent remains ambiguous, how-
ever, a reviewing court must defer to a reasonable agency interpreta-
tion of the statute.20 9 The meaning of the phrase "stationary source" in
200. See Aman, supra note 25, at 1192-1193; see also Noll, Regulation After Re-
gan, 12(3) REG. 13-20 (1988) (arguing that regulation did not protect consumers and was a
less effective measure than markets and other incentives such as taxes in dealing with
market failures).
201. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202. Id. at 845.
203. Id. at 840.
204. See 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (Oct. 14, 1981); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14,
1981).
205. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-66.





2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 123
POWER
the statute was unclear in Chevron; and therefore, following the sec-
ond part of the analysis, the Supreme Court deferred to the EPA's
bubble concept as a reasonable interpretation.2 1
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to articulate a simple two-
part analysis in Chevron, the meaning of the analysis seems open to
conflicting interpretations. In defense of Chevron, Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia has suggested that the decision represents a
confluence of all the pre-Chevron cases that deferred to agency inter-
pretation of a statute.211 Scalia does not think that judicial deference
to agency interpretation may be justified simply on the basis that the
agency possesses a greater degree of expertise in a given field than a
reviewing court. Nor does he believe that the holding in Chevron is
required by the separation of powers doctrine. Scalia argues that the
judiciary does, in fact, enjoy the constitutional power to evaluate com-
peting policies as an aspect of the traditional tools employed by courts
to interpret statutes. 2 2 Rather, Scalia believes that the extent to
which a court must defer to agency interpretation of a statute is a
function of Congress. He interprets Chevron to constitute "an across-
the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discre-
tion is meant."2 13 According to this interpretation, the Supreme Court
has replaced a statute-by-statute evaluation with a rule of law that
when Congress leaves a statutory provision ambiguous, it intends
that the judiciary defer to any reasonable agency interpretation. 214
Rejecting this interpretation of Chevron as simplistic, Supreme Court
210. See id. at 860-66.
211. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (1990).
212. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S.
218, 226 (1994). In MCI, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the FCC's de-
tariffing policy. Id. After an analysis of the meaning of the word "modify' in the statute,
the Court held that the agency interpretation was not entitled to judicial deference when
the interpretation depends on a meaning of the word that permits a fundamental revision
of the statute and not a modification. See id. at 229; see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 29-32 (1996) ("[Tlhe objective indication of the words, rather than the
intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law. ..
213. Scalia, supra note 209, at 516.
214. See INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
In Cardoza-Fonseca, Scalia stated:
Mhis Court has consistently interpreted Chevron - which has been an ex-
tremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in this Court but in
the Courts of Appeals - as holding that courts must give effect to a reasonable
agency interpretation of the statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent
with a clearly expressed congressional intent.
Id. But see Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997)
(noting that the agency needs flexibility to interpret and adapt statutory text in accord
with particular circumstances, policies and values raised in each case).
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Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested that questions of statutory in-
terpretation are too diverse and complex to adopt a single rule ap-
proach.215 Justice Breyer argues that the current doctrine of judicial
review is "anomalous," since it mandates deference to agency inter-
pretation of statutes, while at the same time, it seems to require close
scrutiny of agency discretion among competing policy choices.21 With
regard to policy choices in particular, Breyer thinks that it would be a
mistake for courts to "retreat" from an ad hoc approach to review of
agency discretion. Such an abdication of responsibility by the judici-
ary would place the entire onus on the other two branches of govern-
ment to check "agency excesses.' 17
A more fundamental critique of judicial review of administrative
action views Chevron as a repudiation of Marbury for the bureaucratic
state. This view suggests that the traditional view of the judiciary as
the final arbiter of disputes between individual citizens and govern-
ment has been abrogated in favor of specialized administrative organs
responsible for the implementation of public policy. 18 Administrative
justice no longer concerns the autonomy of the individual protected
through liberal rights theory. The special competence of courts at ap-
praising fairness to individuals must now cede to the technical exper-
tise of administrative bureaucrats in determining what policies opti-
mally advance the general welfare.21 The critique is equally dubious
about the future of the separation of powers doctrine. It argues that
the Chevron and Vermont Yankee decisions demonstrate that the judi-
ciary has abdicated its function in the system of checks and balances.
The judiciary's function as a balance wheel to curtail administrative
excesses has been nullified, leaving in its place only a bureaucratic
215. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REv. 363, 377 (1986); see also Babitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comms. for a Greater Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (An agency head "will confront difficult questions of proximity
and degree," and judicial review of agency decisions with regard to such questions must
proceed "through case-by-case resolution and adjudication.'); Breyer, On the Uses of Leg-
islative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) (discussing five dif-
ferent circumstances when a court might examine legislative history for assistance in in-
terpreting a statute).
216. Breyer, Judicial Review, supra note 215, at 364-65; cf Martin Shapiro, Ad-
ministrative Discretion: The-Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983) (suggesting that differ-
ent types of administrative discretion and judicial review thereof need to be distinguished
for effective administrative government).
217. Breyer, Judicial Review, supra note 215, at 397.
218. See Aman, supra note 25, at 1229-30 (criticizing the Chevron decision and
the resulting expansion of judicial deference to policy choices made by administrative
agencies at the expense of judicial review). But see Zellmer, supra note 154, at 1007-08
(refuting the critique of Chevron as a reversal of the Marbury concept of judicial review
and arguing that policy choices should be left to the legislative and executive branches of
the government).
219. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 1523.
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vacuum waiting to be filled. If this fundamental critique is accurate,
the constitutional theory that underpins administrative law has col-
lapsed. 2 0 Pursuant to the liberal political theory, freedom is defined
primarily by the absence of governmental restraint. The state is al-
ways to be suspect, and its powers carefully curtailed. The doctrines of
the separation of powers and nondelegation of government power re-
flect this suspicion. To the extent that a neutral arbiter is not present
to resolve disputes between government and the governed, liberal po-
litical theory has been defiled.
In the recent case of Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,221 the United States Supreme Court in-
validated administrative rules that were designed to curb tobacco use
by minors.222 After considering a plethora of scientific data as part of
the rule making process, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
had made certain factual findings about the nature and effects of to-
bacco. The agency determined that cigarettes are "drug delivery de-
vices" because they contain nicotine, a highly addictive "psychoactive
substance.12 23 Acknowledging that cigarette smoking may result in
grave injury to the human body and brain, the agency further found
that the majority of human persons who develop a tobacco addiction
start to smoke cigarettes while they are still minors. 224 Upon judicial
review, all nine members of the Supreme Court agreed with the
agency finding that cigarette smoking poses "extraordinary risks" to
health and life. 225 Nonetheless, a five-member majority of the High
Court felt obligated to invalidate regulations that restricted the mar-
220. See EDLEY, supra note 10, at 133-134, 213-64. Christopher Edley has con-
cluded that American administrative justice with its vast delegation of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial functions to non-elected officials, has seriously compromised the pristine
liberal model. Id. Given the impracticability of the pristine nondelegation doctrine, Edley
suggests that the "administrative' state is now inevitable because of the ever-lengthening
agenda of complex public policy problems and the institutional limitations of legislatures."
Id. at 5. Despite the intent that the tripartite separation of powers safeguards against ar-
bitrariness, unelected administrators must be delegated broad discretion to perform leg-
islative and adjudicatory functions. While he is not optimistic about the survival of the
tripartite separation of powers, Edley calls for a more direct partnership among the leg-
islative, judicial, and administrative components of government. Id.
221. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
222. Id. at 125.
223. Id. at 125-26.
224. Id. (citing Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco is a Drug and
These Products are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-




keting, distribution, and sale of cigarettes to persons under the age of
eighteen.1
22
The majority reasoned that Congress had not delegated to the
FDA the requisite authority to regulate tobacco products. The rea-
soning reflected the principle, drawn from the constitutional doctrine
of a separation of powers, that unelected federal judges and adminis-
trative agency heads may act only within the parameters of the
clearly expressed intent of Congress. 27 The separation of powers doc-
trine in turn rests on the classical liberal political theory that exhibits
suspicion about the exercise of government power against individual
autonomy.2 28 Brown & Williamson Tobacco suggests that judicial re-
view may not be as defunct as the critics claim. The Court annulled
the seemingly reasonable agency rules on the ground that the Con-
gress had not specifically delegated to the FDA the power to promul-
gate such regulations. The Court's recent action once again reflects
the liberal suspicion of government power as constitutionally encoded
in the separation of powers and delegation doctrines.
During the final decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court's review of asylum decisions reflected the limits of the protec-
tion of personal autonomy through constitutional rights. The Refugee
Act of 1980229 provided that political refugees might be granted asy-
lum in the United States at the discretion of the Attorney General.
2 0
Starting in the early 1980s, large numbers of Haitian citizens began
to flee their country in hope of gaining political asylum in the United
States.23 In 1981, the Reagan administration ordered the United
States Coast Guard to interdict all Haitian vessels destined for
American shores and interview any person on board who intended to
claim refugee status. The purpose of the brief interview was to deter-
mine whether an individual's asylum claim merited entry into the
United States where further and more formal proceedings could tran-
226. Id. at 1302 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398).
227. Id. at 1297 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)); Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308, 312 (1986) (noting that the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers requires Chevron reasoning). But see Scalia, supra note 213 (reasoning
that rather than the separation of powers doctrine, the theoretical justification for Chev-
ron is a general presumption that in case of ambiguity about congressional intent, the
courts are to defer to agency discretion).
228. See generally EDLEY, supra note 11, at 133-34 (arguing that the conventional
understanding of administrative law as simply reflecting policy choices made by the leg-
islature and executive under the review of the judiciary, fails to reflect the complexities of
government in the modern administrative state).
229. 94 Stat. 102 (1980), 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988).
230. See id.
231. Kevin R. Johnson, A 'Hard Look'at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions,
1991 Utah L. Rev. 279 (1991).
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spire. 212 Most claims, however, were summarily dismissed on the high
seas without any pretense of due process.2 3 In 1991, the United States
State Department reported to Congress that the Haitian army, in
overthrowing the government, had "resorted to brutality and massa-
cre to control the population ... employing violence to intimidate op-
position political supporters, popular organizations, the urban poor,
and the media. .. .," Subsequent to the military coup in Haiti in the
fall of 1991, as thousands fled their homeland in order to repatriate,
the Bush administration established a detention policy under which
Haitian refugees, while still on the high seas, were interdicted and de-
tained in Guantenamo Bay, Cuba.235 When the American naval base
in Guantfinamo could no longer handle the large number of Haitian
refugees, the policy was changed so that interdicted persons were
immediately returned to Haiti without any effort whatsoever to de-
termine whether they had credible asylum claims.
23
As early as 1982, opponents of the short shrift shown to Haitian
refugees had brought suit in the federal district court in order to ob-
tain a judicial remedy against the administrative policy. 23 7 Typically,
the determination of political refugee status, an administrative judg-
ment left to the State Department and the INS, was granted almost
232. The policy was entered into by the United States and Haitian governments.
See U.S.-Haiti Interdiction Agreement, Signed at Port-au-Prince, September 23, 1981,
Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. § 180 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at 1259
(1988).
233. Johnson, supra note 231, at 283-84.
234. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 102d Cong., Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1991, pp. 633-34 (Comm. Print 1992).
235. The detention of the Haitian refugees in Cuba was not without irony. When
Fidel Castro overthrew the Cuban government in a violent revolution in 1959, thousands
of Cuban nationals fled their homeland in order to avoid persecution and hardship. Cas-
tro's Communist government quickly suppressed any semblance of freedom of press,
speech, religion, and assembly. Without due process of law, many were incarcerated, bru-
talized, and murdered. Private property was seized, and citizens were routinely relocated
to agricultural camps. Horrified by the turn of events, the U.S. government quickly ex-
tended a welcome to the refugees who often arrived in Florida by means of small boats
and make-shift rafts after enduring immense suffering. For an account of the Cuban
revolution and the repressive policies of the Castro government, see EDWARD GONZALEZ,
CUBA UNDER CASTRO: THE LIMITS OF CHARISMA (1974). This is not to suggest, however,
that every aspect of Castro's reform has had an adverse impact on the Cuban people.
Compared to other Caribbean nations, Cuba of the 1990s has significantly less poverty
and illiteracy, and better health care for the poor. See MARIFELI PtREZ-STABLE, THE
CUBAN REVOLUTION: ORIGINS, COURSE AND LEGACY (1993).
236. The new regulation stressed that "parole" to the United States for further
proceedings was to be afforded only when it was "strictly in the public interest." 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5 (1991).
237. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, 711 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1983).
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
automatically."'8 Even while Cubans escaping Castro's repressive gov-
ernment were routinely afforded political asylum, Haitians fleeing
what was at the time a seemingly more repressive regime had little
hope to expect similar treatment."9 The Supreme Court's 1985 deci-
sion in Jean v. Nelson rejected constitutional arguments brought on
behalf of the Haitians subject to the interdiction.2 4 0 Commenting on
the 1980 Refugee Act, the Supreme Court observed that it constituted
legislative recognition of the administrative policy of the previous
thirty years under which unlimited "parole" was afforded almost
automatically to refugees who fled to the United States from political
persecution.24 The Court noted the Solicitor General's word that there
was no ongoing discrimination against Haitians by the INS, and re-
manded the case to the district court for consideration as to whether
or not INS officials acted within their broad statutory discretion. 24 2 In
1991, the Court again adopted a deferential stance to administrative
policy of Haitian interdiction when it held in United States Depart-
ment of State v. Ray243 that INS was not bound under the Freedom of
Information Act to release the names of Haitians who sought asylum,
but were returned to Haiti. 244 The Court reasoned that the Freedom of
Information Act was not intended as a means offered to refugee advo-
cates and human rights activists for verifying whether or not persons
who were returned to Haiti suffered subsequent persecution. 241 Thus,
the judicial branch acquiesced to the administrative policy of interdic-
tion and summary dismissal of asylum claims without constitutional
due process.
2 46
238. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985).
239. From June 1983 to September 1988, the INS granted seven times more
asylum claims for Cubans than for Haitians, despite the much larger number of Haitian
refugees and the fact that many Cubans seeking asylum were convicted felons. Johnson,
supra note 231, at 346. In 1992, the INS continued to grant a large number of Cuban
claims. See Larry Rohter, New Wave of Cubans Sails to Florida Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 1992, at Al.
240. 472 U.S. at 857.
241. See id. at 849 (describing the parole as "unlimited").
242. Id. at 855-57.
243. 502 U.S. 164(1991).
244. Id. at 78.
245. Id. at 177-79.
246. It was argued that the Bush administration's interdiction program violated
international law. See Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens
and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2335-46
(1991). Bill Clinton promised that, if elected President, he would reverse the policy. Upon
being elected, President Clinton reneged on his campaign promise and continued the pol-
icy of the Bush administration. Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the Executive
Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The
Case of the Haitian Asylum Seekers, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10-14 (1993).
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As the twenty-first century dawned, the Supreme Court upheld
the role of judicial review of the exercise of administrative power in
two cases involving the deportation of resident aliens. At the outset of
this article, the Court's decisions in INS v. St. Cyr and Zadvydas v.
Davis were mentioned as examples of a broad interpretation of the ju-
diciary's jurisdiction to review administrative action.2 7 In these cases,
the Supreme Court refused to preclude judicial review of habeas peti-
tions brought by resident aliens who had been convicted of aggravated
felonies and were to be deported after serving prison terms. The alien
in St. Cyr sought to challenge Attorney General Janet Reno's opinion
that Congress had withdrawn administrative discretion to waive de-
portation pursuant to the standard interpretation of Section 212(c) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.24 '8 The two men to be deported in
Zadvydas petitioned for review of their indefinite detention subse-
quent to deportation proceedings, when no nation could be identified
that was willing to receive the deportees.24 ' They disputed the inter-
pretation of statutory changes in immigration law that the Attorney
General enjoyed non-reviewable discretion to detain deportees.2 0 The
five-member majority in Zadvydas acknowledged that Congress has
"plenary power" to fashion immigration law, and that the judicial
branch must defer to legislative and executive policy.251 A slightly dif-
ferent five-member majority recalled in St. Cyr that judicial review
functions to express the constitutional limits on the exercise of execu-
tive and legislative power.2 2 In both cases, the Court was confronted
with constructions of the respective statutes that precluded judicial
247. See pp. 91-92 supra.
248. See INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2276 (2001). In St. Cyr, the Court stated
"the class of aliens whose continued residence in this country has depended on their eligi-
bility for § 212(c) relief is extremely large, and not surprisingly, a substantial percentage
of their applications for § 212(c) relief have been granted." Id. at 2276-77.
249. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2496-97 (2001) (Kestutis Zadvydas
was rejected by Germany, Lithuania and the Dominican Republic while in INS detention
from 1994-1997 prior to his habeas petition to the Federal District Court in the Eastern
District of Louisiana. After the ninety-day removal period expired, the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Washington determined that there was no "realistic
chance" for Cambodia to accept deportee Kim Ho Ma.).
250. Id. at 2497 (The deportees did not dispute the Attorney General's discretion
but rather the extent of the Attorney General's authority under the statute of the post-
removal period statute.).
251. Id. at 2501 (Justice Stephens delivered the opinion of the Court joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer.).
252. See St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2278-79 (Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg. Noting the "strong
presumption in favor of judicial review," the Court adopted a construction of the statute
that would not give rise to constitutional problems.).
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review; and in each instance, the Court elected alternative interpreta-
tions that did not raise fundamental constitutional problems.253
An important distinction between the Haitian refugee cases and
St. Cyr and Zadvydas lies in the judicial doctrine that the constitu-
tional due process guarantees do not apply to aliens outside the
United States. 26 Contrary to the plight of the Haitian refugees on the
high seas, these more recent cases attest to the Supreme Court's
willingness to protect the autonomy of resident aliens. Yet, the slim
and sundry majorities in the more recent immigration cases indicates
that the Court's approbation of judicial scrutiny might facilely shift to
deference toward administrative action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the increasing significance of national and global regula-
tory regimes, this article has sketched in broad strokes the develop-
ment of judicial review of administrative power in the United
States.2 w The description has been organized around three historical
periods identified as: from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; to
the New Deal and the APA; to the second half of the twentieth and
start of the new century. In addition to the statutory and common law
justifications for judicial review, the article has suggested that judicial
review in the federal courts has developed to maintain two values that
underpin the constitutional theory of liberal democracy. The interre-
lated values are the suspicion of government power as manifested
through the tripartite separation of powers, and personal autonomy
as safeguarded through individual rights.
1. Suspicion of Administrative Power
Despite the doctrine against the delegation of legislative and ju-
dicial power, federal administrative agencies vested with such power
expanded throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fol-
253. See id. at 2279 ("A construction of the amendments at issue that would en-
tirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial
constitutional questions."); Zadvydas, 121 U.S. at 2498 (When the construction of a stat-
ute raises a serious constitutional problem, the Court will ascertain if an alternative, non-
problematic construction, is available.).
254. See Zadvydas, 121 U.S. at 2493 (citing Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1950) (nonresident aliens do not benefit from the procedural protections of
the United Sates Constitution)). See also U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269
(1990) (due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment do not apply to aliens outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States).
255. Systems of national and global administrative government now regulate the
distribution of such fundamental human resources as food, housing, education, social se-
curity, energy, environment, financial capital, and technological information.
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lowing the Civil War, the Court exercised its power of judicial review
in Cincinnati to curtail the activity of the ICC on the ground that
Congress had not delegated it the power to establish rates.25 The
post-bellum Supreme Court permitted only administrative action that
remained within the contours of the specific congressional delegation.
This judicial suspicion continued at the inception of the New
Deal when the Court struck down the broad delegation of government
power in Schechter Poultry.257 The Court's eventual approval of the
NLRA, the Social Security Act and the re-enacted AAA marked a shift
from suspicion to deference. After World War II, the enactment of the
APA coincided with judicial deference. At the same time, the APA's
explicit provisions for judicial review preserved suspicion. Designed
upon the traditional model, the APA provisions were intended to en-
sure that legislative delegations of power were not overly broad, and
specific actions of unelected bureaucrats remained within the parame-
ters of the power delegated to the administrative agency by statute.
As the bureaucratic state expanded in the 1960s, rule making
and adjudication by administrative agencies began to constitute the
primary manifestation of government activity into the lives of most
Americans. The federal courts reasserted the suspicion of administra-
tive power by adopting the "hard look" approach to judicial scrutiny of
agency decision making process. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court
refused to defer to the expertise of the Secretary for the Department
of Transportation about the location of a highway." However, in its
landmark Chevron decision, the Court returned to a more deferential
approach to agency interpretations of underlying congressional legis-
lation. 259 Most recently, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the Court
invalidated FDA rules on the ground that Congress had not delegated
the power for the administrative agency to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts. 2 ° Even as regulatory regimes have required increasingly com-
plex technical expertise by administrators, judicial review has served
as an ongoing reminder that the legislative body, and not unelected
technical experts, are vested by the citizens to reach fundamental
policy choices. As long as administrators have acted in accord with the
legislative design, the courts have tended to show deference to regula-
tory goals and implementation.
256. 167 U.S. 479, 511(1897).
257. 295 U.S. 495,539, 551 (1935).
258. 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1871).
259. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
260. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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2. Individual Autonomy
Nineteenth century administrative law cases disclose a vision of
the radically autonomous entrepreneur-whether a railroad baron
seeking to create a monopoly or a single craftsman contracting to
work long hours-who enjoyed subjective rights to enter contractual
agreements unfettered by undue government interference. Only gov-
ernment regulation that was crafted to maintain an allegedly neutral
market and compensate for market failure was likely to pass judicial
muster. As illustrated in the infamous Lochner v. New York, decision,
the Supreme Court attempted to justify its laissez-faire attitude to-
wards the government regulation of business with language that iden-
tified the individual's subjective right to enter contracts and own pri-
vate property.
2 61
This laissez-faire approach continued even up to the start of the
New Deal regulatory programs. The Supreme Court initially adhered
to a preference for entrepreneurial autonomy when it invalidated key
components of the New Deal recovery plan, the NIRA and AAA. The
reasoning of Lochner reappeared in Morehead, when the Court invali-
dated a state statute that established a minimum wage for women.
262
As the executive and legislative branches of the federal government
passed regulatory programs to protect the autonomy of many indi-
viduals, left unemployed by the economic crisis of the Great Depres-
sion, judicial review became more deferential to the programs. In a
series of cases starting with West Coast Hotel, the protection of auton-
omy shifted from concern for private entrepreneurs to the rights of
working-class individuals. 2 ' The new judicial deference to govern-
ment efforts that protected the rights of individual citizens extended
throughout the post-World War II years. During this period, the
newly enacted APA fashioned the procedure of administrative justice
to ensure fairness, consistency, and neutrality in the treatment of in-
dividuals.
The parameters of personal autonomy reached a zenith in the
case of Goldberg with the recognition of a new set of procedural rights
vested in the individual person against administrative power.2 4 As
illustrated in the 1960s cases of United Church of Christ and Scenic
Hudson, the federal courts employed a less deferential level of judicial
review to insure the rights of participation by individual citizens to
261. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
262. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
263. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
264. 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970).
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check agency decision making power.26 The scope of personal auton-
omy that merits protection through constitutional rights was tested in
several immigration cases as the century turned. In Jean, the Court
imposed a deferential non-constitutional remedy on a group of Haitian
refugees seeking asylum. 2" More recently, in St. Cyr and Zadvydas, the
Court affirmed the significance of the judicial review of the habeas pe-
titions of resident aliens on the ground that alternative statutory con-
structions would raise serious constitutional problems.
2 7
As indicated throughout this article, it is, of course, possible to
attribute various social, political and economic factors to explain the
oscillation between suspicion and deference, and the degrees thereof,
in the historical development of judicial review of administrative
power. Notwithstanding such valid alternative explanations, this his-
torical overview has focused on the significance of the constitutional
issues of the separation of powers and subjective legal rights. The two
constitutional issues are interrelated as they stem from values of the
suspicion of government power and personal autonomy, which are
embodied deep within classical political theory. The tension in liberal
theory between suspicion and trust as well as that between autonomy
and participation may account, at least in part, for the oscillation in
the historical development of American judicial review of administra-
tive power.
For as long as liberal theory, with its inherent tensions, serves as
the philosophical foundation for constitutional government, the oscil-
lation is likely to remain. The traditional model of administrative law,
which envisaged judicial resolution of disputes between individuals
and agency officials, will increasingly encounter a theory of judicial
deference to agency expertise in implementing public policy through
rule making. As regulatory governance continues to increase in sig-
nificance, the historical development of American administrative law
serves as a reminder that government based on liberal theory will
need to include a healthy role for the judiciary. Judicial review of ad-
ministrative action is simply too important for the protection of indi-
vidual autonomy against government power to be forsaken.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 160-76 (discussing closer scrutiny by the
federal courts at agency decisions).
266. 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985).
267. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001); and Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct.
2491 (2001).

